'Just convict everyone!' Joint perpetration: From tadic to stakic and back again by Badar, ME
“Just Convict Everyone!” – Joint Perpetration: From Tadic´ to
Stakic´ and Back Again
MOHAMED ELEWA BADAR*
Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic´: Judgment of the Appeals Chamber1
1. Introduction
On 22 March 2006, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) rendered its Judgment in the
Stakic´ case.2 Dr. Milomir Stakic´, the former President of the Prijedor
Municipal Assembly, was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment by
the Trial Chamber for his participation in the murder, extermination and per-
secution (incorporating deportation) of the non-Serb population in Prijedor.3
Both the Defence and the Prosecution filed appeals against the Trial
Chamber’s Judgment and Sentence.4 The Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial
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1 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment, 22 March 2006
(Stakic´ Appeals Judgment).
2 Ibid.
3 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003,
Disposition, (Stakic´ Trial Judgment).
4 The Appellant appealed on the grounds that the Trial Chamber allegedly: erred in law and
fact by allowing an expansion of the Indictment; erred in law and fact during the course of the trial
proceedings; erred in fact leading to a miscarriage of justice; erred in law and fact in the
application of Article 5 of the Statute; erred in law and fact in the application of Article 3 of 
the Statute; erred in law and fact on the issue of sentencing; and erred in law and fact regarding
cumulative convictions. The Prosecution appealed on the grounds that the Trial Chamber
allegedly: erred in law in finding that the appellant did not have the requisite intent for genocide
under Article 4 of the Statute; erred in law and/or fact in its consideration of Article 4(3)(c) of
the Statute; erred in law in its conclusion that the Bosnian Croats did not form a group or part
of a group targeted for genocide under Article 4 of the Statute; erred of law in failing to cumu-
latively convicted the Appellant on Counts 3 (murder as a crime against humanity) and 7 (depor-
tation as a crime against humanity). In short, the first three Prosecution grounds were dismissed.
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Chamber’s decision to convict Stakic´ for his responsibility in the aforemen-
tioned crimes. It also agreed with the Trial Chamber’s decision to acquit
Milomir Stakic´ of genocide and complicity in genocide.5 The Appeals Chamber,
however, found that the Trial Chamber incorrectly failed to convict Stakic´ for
deporting and forcibly transferring the non-Serb population.6 Based on an error
made by the Trial Chamber regarding the sentence, the Appeals Chamber
imposed a global sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment on the Appellant.7
One of the issues which the Appeals Chamber addressed propio motu was
the mode of liability attributed to the Appellant by the Trial Chamber.8 In
examining the criminal responsibility of Dr. Milomir Stakic´ for the crimes
alleged, the Trial Chamber applied a mode of liability which it termed ‘co-
perpetratorship’ (committing ‘jointly with another person’), in lieu of ‘joint
criminal enterprise’ (JCE). In so doing, the Stakic´ Trial Chamber avoided
“the misleading impression that a new crime [membership in a criminal
organization] not foreseen in the Statute of this Tribunal has been introduced
through the backdoor.”9 However, “[t]he introduction of new modes of lia-
bility [co-perpetratorship] into the jurisprudence of the Tribunal”, the
Appeals Chamber stressed, “may generate uncertainty, if not confusion, in
the determination of the law by parties to cases before the Tribunal as well
as in the application of the law by Trial Chambers.”10
Most notably, some ICTY judges have welcomed and fully approved the
JCE doctrine “as an effective tool for overcoming the problems of ascribing
individual criminal responsibility for international crimes.”11 Others hold the
opinion that the concept of ‘joint criminal enterprise’, since its foundation and
integration into the jurisprudence of the ICTY by the Tadic´Appeals Chamber,
“has caused confusion and a waste of time”12 and has been considered as a
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5 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, Disposition.
6 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, Disposition.
7 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, Disposition.
8 Neither party has appealed the Trial Chamber’s application of this mode of liability,
notably, “co-perpetratorship”.
9 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 441 (footnotes omitted). Unfortunately, the Stakic´ Trial
Judgment did not make any effort to determine whether or not this concept, Mittäterschaft
(“co-perpetratorship”), as it stands in German criminal law, may have reflected customary inter-
national law at the time the crimes at issue were committed. In footnote 949 of the Judgment,
the Stakic´ Trial Chamber made references to two eminent common law scholars, but that was
not sufficient to prove that this German concept may reflect customary international law.
10 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 59.
11 For a systematic analysis on the law of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ in the jurisprudence of
the ICTY, see Verena Haan, ‘The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 5 International Criminal Law
Review (2005) 167–201.
12 Prosecutor v Blagoje Simic´ et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T, Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003
(Simic´ Trial Chamber), Separate and Partly Opinion of Judge Per-Johan Lindholm, paras. 2–5.
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doctrine “of no benefit to the work of the Tribunal or the development of
international criminal law.”13 This note will examine, therefore, both modes
of liability (‘joint criminal enterprise’ and ‘co-perpetratorship’) in light of
the Stakic´ Appeals and Trial Judgments.
2. The Integration of ‘Co-Perpetratorship’ in the Case Law of the ICTY
In its analysis of the responsibility of Dr. Milomir Stakic´, the Trial Chamber
explicitly rejected the application of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ as a mode of
liability despite the fact that it had been pleaded by the Prosecution both in
the indictment14 and at trial.15 The Stakic´ Trial Chamber holds the opinion
that “joint criminal enterprise is only one of several interpretations of the
term ‘commission’ under Article 7(1) of the Statute and that other definitions
of co-perpetration must equally be taken into account.”16 “A more direct ref-
erence to ‘commission’ in its traditional sense”, according to the Stakic´ Trial
Chamber, “should be given priority before considering responsibility under
the judicial term ‘joint criminal enterprise’.”17
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13 Prosecutor v Blagoje Simic´ et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T, Trial Judgment, 17 October 2003
(Simic´ Trial Judgment) Separate and Partly Opinion of Judge Per-Johan Lindholm, paras. 2–5.
The entire passage of Judge Lindholm reads as follows, “I dissociate myself from the concept
or doctrine of joint criminal enterprise in this case as well as generally. The so-called basic
form of joint criminal enterprise does not, in my opinion, have any substance of its own. It is
nothing more than a new label affixed to a since well-known concept or doctrine in most juris-
dictions as well as in international criminal law, namely co-perpetration. . . . If something else
than participation as co-perpetrator is intended to be covered by the concept of joint criminal
enterprise, there seems to arise a conflict between the concept and the word ‘committed’ in
Article 7(1) of the Statute.” Ibid., para, 2. In Krnojelac´, the Trial Chamber declined to apply
the second category of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ because in their view it did not comply with
the principle of individual criminal responsibility, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac´, Case
No. IT-97-25-T, Trial Judgment, 15 March 2002, (Krnojelac´ Trial Judgment) para. 78.
14 See the Prosecution Fourth Amended Indictment (Case No. IT-97-24-PT) para. 26:
“Milomir STAKIC´participated in the joint criminal enterprise, in his roles as set out . . . above.
The purpose of the joint criminal enterprise was the permanent forcible removal of Bosnian
Croat inhabitants from the territory of the planned Serbian state, including a campaign of per-
secutions through the commission of the crimes alleged in Counts 1 to 8 of the Indictment.
15 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 82, cited in Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 58, fn. 138.
16 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 438. Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute provides: “a person
who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall
be individually responsible for the crime.”
17 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 438. In Simic´, Judge Per-Johan Lindholm upholds the same
opinion, Simic´ Trial Judgment, Separate and Partly Opinion of Judge Per-Johan Lindholm,
supra note 13, para. 2.
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The Stakic´ Judgment defined the word ‘committed’ under Article 7(1) of
the ICTY Statute in the following words: “[T]he accused participated, phys-
ically or otherwise directly or indirectly, in the material elements of the crime
charged through positive acts or, based on duty to act, omissions, whether
individually or jointly with others. The accused himself need not have par-
ticipated in all aspects of the alleged criminal conduct.”18
Thus, in order to meet the requirements of ‘co-perpetratorship’ as a mode
of liability, the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that there
was (i) an explicit agreement or silent consent between two or more individ-
uals to reach a common goal; (ii) by coordinated co-operation; and (iii) joint
control over the criminal conduct.19 The Stakic´ Judgment requires that the co-
perpetrators can only realize their plan insofar as they act jointly, but each
individual can ruin the whole plan if he does not carry out his part. To this
extent, each of the co-perpetrators is in control of the act.20 In order to clar-
ify its position, the Judgment referred to Professor Claus Roxin’s example:
“[i]f two people govern a country together – are joint rulers in the literal
sense of the word – the usual consequence is that the acts of each depend on
the co-perpetration of the other. The reverse side of this is, inevitably, the fact
that by refusing to participate, each person individually can frustrate the
action.”21
In addition to the mens rea required for the specific crime charged, this
mode of liability (co-perpetratorship) requires proof of (i) mutual awareness
of substantial likelihood that crimes would occur; and (ii) the defendant’s
awareness of the importance of his own role.22 Applying this mode of liabil-
ity to the facts of the present case, the Trial Chamber was convinced that: “Dr.
Stakic´ knew that his role and authority as the leading politician in Prijedor
was essential for the accomplishment of the common goal. He was aware that
he could frustrate the objective of achieving a Serbian municipality by using
his powers to hold to account those responsible for crimes, by protecting or
assisting non Serbs or by stepping down from his superior position.”23
In view of the aforementioned, it is clear that the Trial Chamber understands
the meaning of the word ‘committing’ under Article 7(1) of the ICTY-Statute
in broader terms. Thus, “[b]y accepting the mutual attribution of contributions
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18 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 439.
19 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 440.
20 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 440 quoting Claus Roxin, (Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft
“Perpetration and Control Over the Act” (Berlin, New York, 1994) 278.
21 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 440 (footnotes omitted).
22 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 495–497.
23 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 498.
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made in functional division of labour for the accomplishment of the crime,
not only the person who physically kills the victim, but also the organizer of
the plan and the provider of means can be held liable as co-perpetrators.”24
On this particular point, the Stakic´ Trial Chamber applied “a combination of
two forms of commission, known in German criminal law as Mittäterschaft (“co-
perpetration”) and mittelbare Täterschaft (“perpetrator behind the direct perpe-
trator”).”25 This approach put an end to a long-lasting debate regarding the
issue of whether participants who carried out criminal conducts which form no
part of the actus reus of the offence but, nonetheless, have a decisive role in its
commission may be considered co-perpetrators or mere accomplices. The fol-
lowing hypothetical case is illustrative on that matter. A, B, and C agree to
destroy an ethnic group, D, by poisoning the main water pipe which provides
this group with their daily water. C, the chemical expert, provides A and B with
the sufficient amount of poison. A and B carry out the criminal conduct by
adding the poison into the pipe. Is C a co-perpetrator or mere accomplice?
Applying Stakic´’s co-perpetratorship approach to the present hypothetical
example, C is considered a co-perpetrator and not a mere accomplice, so long
as he satisfies the above mentioned requirements.26 C’s appearance on the scene
when the actus reus (criminal conduct) of offence was carried out is not
required to consider him a co-perpetrator, according to the Stakic´ conception.27
However, one important question remains unresolved regarding this
mode of liability as introduced by the Stakic´ Trial Chamber. Difficulties
appear in cases where the definition or the character of an offence varies
according to the intent or the knowledge possessed by one or more co-per-
petrators with which the crime has been committed. The question which
arises is whether the effect of such intent or knowledge shall extend to the
other co-perpetrators concerned in the commission of the offence at issue.
The following hypothetical example illustrates this. A, B, and C, high
ranking officials in State X, agreed to conduct a widespread and system-
atic campaign to exterminate all those who opposed their government pol-
icy. In carrying out this agreement, C had a further intent to conduct
this campaign in order to destroy in whole or in part a religious group
which also opposed State X’s policy. Did A, and B commit the crime of
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24 Albin Eser, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in Antonio Cassese et al., (eds), I The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002) 767–822, at 790.
25 Verena Haan, supra note 11, at 197.
26 See supra notes 19, 20 and the accompanying text.
27 Whether each co-perpetrator must necessarily be on the scene when the crime is accom-
plished or whether even a contribution in the preparatory stage may suffice are still disputed
questions in German criminal law, see Albin Eser, supra note 24, at 791, fn. 95.
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genocide?28 Surprisingly, according to the third category of ‘joint criminal
enterprise’,29 A and B may be held criminally liable for the crime of geno-
cide if it was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the execution of the
initial criminal plan (extermination as a crime against humanity).
Despite the fact that the Stakic´ Trial Judgment limited itself to the clear
wording of the Statute when interpreting ‘committing’ in the form of ‘co-
perpetration’, in lieu of joint criminal enterprise, the Appeals Chamber’s
recent Judgment marked the death of this mode of liability in the jurispru-
dence of the ICTY. The Appeals Chamber declared: “the Trial Chamber erred
in conducting its analysis of the responsibility of the Appellant within the
framework of ‘co-perpetratorship’. This mode of liability . . . does not have
support in customary international law . . . By contrast, joint criminal enter-
prise is a mode of liability which is firmly established in customary interna-
tional law and is routinely applied in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.”30
2.1 In the Appeals Chamber: Incorporating ‘Co-Perpetratorship’ in 
‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’
In paragraph 62 of its judgment, the Stakic´ Appeals Chamber confirmed that
the Trial Chamber decision as to the mode of liability it employed is invali-
dated,31 and the sole remedy is to apply the correct legal framework – joint
criminal enterprise – to the factual conclusions of the Trial Chamber.32 In so
doing, the Appeals Chamber confined itself to examine the first and third cat-
egory of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ as understood from the plain language of
the Indictment.33 In order to reach a decision as to whether the first and third
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28 The answer may be found in the very last sentence of Article 39(2) of the Egyptian Penal
Code. Article 39 provides: “A person is concerned as a principal in the commission of an offence:
(1) Who commits such offence whether alone or in conjunction with others; or
(2) Who in the case of an offence consisting of two or more acts, knowingly participates
in such offence by doing one or more of such acts.
Provided that where circumstances personal to any principal are such as to modify with
respect to such principal either the character of the offence or the penalty, the effect of such
circumstances shall not extend to other principles concerned in the commission of the offence.
The like rule shall apply when the character of the offence varies according to the intent or the
knowledge with which it has been committed.”
29 See Section 2.1.3 of the present case note.
30 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 62 (footnotes omitted).
31 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 62.
32 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 63.
33 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 66. In paragraph 26 of the Indictment, the Prosecution
alleged that the purpose of the joint criminal enterprise was a campaign of persecutions that
encompassed the crimes alleged in counts 1 through 8 of the Indictment. The Appeals
Chamber found that, in this paragapgh, the Prosecution was plainly alleging a basic joint crim-
inal eneterprise – the crimes alleged were within the common purpose. In paragraphs 28 and
29 of the Indictment, however, the Prosecution set out an alternative theory:
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categories of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ may be fitting of the factual findings of
the Stakic´ Trial Judgment, the Appeals Chamber conducted a three tiered test.
2.1.1 Did the Appellant Participate in a ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’?
In determining whether the Trial Chamber’s factual findings show that the
Appellant bears the basic (or first) category ‘joint criminal enterprise’ liabil-
ity for the crimes encompassed by the criminal purpose, the Appeals
Chamber found:
“[t]he common goal identified by the Trial Chamber amounted to a com-
mon purpose within the meaning of the Tribunal’s joint criminal enter-
prise doctrine. This common purpose consisted of a discriminatory
campaign to ethnically cleanse the Municipality of Prijedor by deporting
and persecuting Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in order to estab-
lish Serbian control (“Common Purpose”). . . . The campaign consisted
of criminal acts prescribed in the Statute of this Tribunal, notably the
crimes against humanity of persecutions, deportation and other inhu-
mane acts. . . .”34
Convinced that the Trial Chamber’s factual findings supported the conclusion
that the Appellant had participated in a joint criminal enterprise as mentioned
above, the Appeals Chamber went on to examine the following question.
2.1.2 Did the Appellant Intend to further the ‘Common Purpose’
of the Joint Criminal Enterprise?
In examining the relevant passages of the Trial Judgment regarding the pres-
ent query, the Appeals Chamber found that various findings of the Trial
Chamber demonstrate the existence of a shared intent among the participants
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Para. 28: “Aternatively, the accused is individually responsible for the crimes enumerated
in Counts 1 to 8 on the basis that these crimes were natural and foreseeable consequences of
the execution of the common purpose of the joint criminal enterprise and Milomir STAKIC´
was aware that these crimes were the possible consequence of the execution of the joint crim-
inal enterprise.”
Para. 29: “Despite his awareness of the possible consequences, Milomir STAKIC´ know-
ingly and wilfully participated in the joint criminal eneterprise. On this basis, he bears indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for these crimes under Article 7(1) in addition to his
responsibility under the same article having planned, instigated, ordered or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planing, preparaition, or execution of these crimes.” (emphasis in original).
34 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 75 (emphasis are in original). According to the Tadic´
Appeal Chamber, the basic category of joint criminal enterprise requires proof that the
accused shared the intent specifically necessary for the concrete offence and voluntarily par-
ticipated in that enterprise, see Prosecutor v. Dusˇko Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals
Judgment, 15 July 1999 (Tadic´ Appeals Judgment) paras. 190–206.
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in the joint criminal enterprise.35 One passage of the Trial Chamber’s findings
which is obviously based on Professor Claus Roxin’s theory of ‘joint control
over the act’ was incorporated by the Appeals Chamber into the realm of joint
criminal enterprise of the first category. This paragraph reads as follows:
“[t]he Trial Chamber is convinced that Dr. Stakic´ knew that his role and
authority as the leading politician in Prijedor was essential for the accom-
plishment of the common goal. He was aware that he could frustrate the
objective of achieving a Serbian municipality by using his powers to hold to
account those responsible for crimes, by protecting or assisting non-Serbs or
by stepping down from his superior positions.”36
Applying the legal framework of joint criminal enterprise to the factual
findings, the Appeals Chamber concluded that there was a ‘joint criminal
enterprise’ of the first category operating in the Municipality of Prijedor and
that the Appellant was (i) a participant in that joint criminal enterprise;
(ii) made a substantial contribution to the implantation of the common purpose;
and (iii) shared the intent to further it.37
Having established the existence of first category joint criminal enterprise
liability for persecution, deportation, and other inhuman acts (forcible trans-
fer) on the part of the Appellant, the Appeals Chamber turned to the remain-
ing question of whether the factual findings of the Trial Chamber also
support a finding of third category joint criminal enterprise liability for cer-
tain crimes.38
2.1.3 Does the Appellant Incur Third Category Joint Criminal Enterprise
Liability for Certain Crimes Falling Outside the Scope of the Enterprise?
According to the Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, for the application of third cate-
gory joint criminal enterprise liability, the following elements must be estab-
lished: “(a) crimes outside the Common Purpose have occurred; (b) these
crimes were a natural and foreseeable consequence of effecting the Common
Purpose; and (c) the participant in the joint criminal enterprise was aware
that the crimes were a possible consequence of the execution of the Common
Purpose, and in that awareness, he nevertheless acted in furtherance of the
Common Purpose.”39
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35 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 80.
36 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 498 quoted by Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 82.
37 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 85.
38 The remaining crimes for which the Appellant was found criminally responsible by the
Trial Chamber under the ‘co-perpetration’ concept were murder as a war crime and crimes
against humanity and the crime of extermination.
39 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 87 (capital letters are in original).
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At this stage, the Appeals Chamber had to evaluate the factual findings of
the Trial Judgment in order to reach a conclusion as to whether these find-
ings demonstrate that the Appellant had the requisite mens rea to be found
responsible under the third category of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ for the
crimes of murder (as a war crimes and as a crime against humanity) and
extermination.40 In so doing, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial
Chamber’s factual findings “demonstrate that the Appellant had the requisite
mens rea to be found responsible under the third category of joint criminal
enterprise . . . [for the foregoing crimes].”41
3. Conclusion
A major source of concern with regard to the applicability of JCE III in the
sphere of international criminal law is that under both the objective and sub-
jective standards, the participant is unfairly held liable for criminal conducts
that he neither intended nor participated in. It is also unjust that the liability
of the actual perpetrator (the one who carried out the crime outside the com-
mon plan) is tested subjectively whereas that of the participant is tested
objectively. Moreover, if the accused had actually participated in crimes out-
side the initial plan ‘common purpose’ as an aider or abettor they would
arguably have an increased chance of acquittal, as the Prosecution would be
confronted with having to prove a higher level of mental awareness, namely,
that the accused knew that the principal perpetrator had the state of mind
required for the crime at issue.42 Finally, and more dramatically, this extended
category of JCE serves to convict the participant in a common plan for
crimes carried out by the actual perpetrator even if the former lacks the state
of mind or the mens rea required for the crime in question (particularly spe-
cific purpose crimes).43
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40 While examining the modes of participation pursuant to Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the
ICTY Statute and particularly the three categories of joint criminal enterprise under which
Stakic´ was charged the Trial Chamber noted with special reference to the mens rea of joint
criminal enterprise that “Article 7(1) lists modes of liability only. These can not change or
replace elements of crimes defined in the Statute. In particular, the mens rea elements required
for an offence listed in the Statute cannot be altered.” Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 437.
41 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 98.
42 See Tadic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 229.
43 For a critical views with regard to the applicability of the third category of ‘joint crimi-
nal enterprise’ see Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, ‘The judgment of the ICTY Appeals
Chambr on the merits in the Tadic case’, International Review of the Red Cross No. 839
(2000) 739–769.
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Today many crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia fall within the ambit of JCE III: the most
recent was extermination as a crime against humanity.44 One serious problem
that will soon confront the Yugoslavia Tribunal is the applicability of JCE III
to specific purpose crimes, notably torture, genocide, persecution, and the
crime of terror against the civilian population.45 It is questionable whether
individuals should be convicted of such high profile and morally culpable
crimes, on the basis of mere foresight. Addressing this point, the Stakic´ Trial
Chamber spelled out its concerns in the following words, “the application of
a mode of liability can not replace a core element of a crime. The Prosecution
confuses modes of liability and the crimes themselves. Conflating the third
variant of joint criminal enterprise and the crime of genocide would result in
the dolus specialis being so watered down that it is extinguished.”46
If, one day, the Prosecution succeeds in granting a conviction for one of
the ‘specific purpose crimes’ under the third category of joint criminal enter-
prise, this will alter the JCE doctrine to become an umbrella to ‘just convict
everyone’.47
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44 Stakic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 98.
45 See Mohamed Elewa Badar, ‘Drawing the Boundaries of Mens Rea in the Jurisprudence
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 6/3 International Criminal
Law Review (2006) ( forthcoming).
46 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 530. See also Prosecutor v. Radoslav Bard-anin, Decision on
Motion for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Chamber Decision,
28 November 2003, para. 57 (“This specific intent [of genocide] cannot be reconciled with the
mens rea for a conviction pursuant to the third category of JCE. The latter consists of the
accused’s awareness of the risk that genocide would be committed by other members of
the JCE. This is a different mens rea and falls short of the threshold needed to satisfy the spe-
cific intent required for a conviction for genocide under Article 4(3)(a).”) Most notably, this
finding by the Trial Chamber was overturned by the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Radoslav
Bard-anin, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeals Chamber Decision,
19 March 2004.
47 The term “just convict everyone” was used by Professor William Schabas as an alterna-
tive to the third category of JCE during a lecture at the 5th Annual ‘International Criminal
Court-Summer Course’, Galway, 2005.
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